Perspectives on Punic Th alassocracy
In 1958, George and Colette Picard likened the city of Carthage to a ship anchored off the African coast. Th e image was recast by Fernand Braudel in 1969 when he remarked that, "Carthage, on the hill of Byrsa between its two lagoons, was compared by Appian to a ship at anchor. "
1 We might forgive Braudel, a medievalist, whose unrevised manuscript remained unpublished until aft er his death, for confusing an ancient and a modern account. Or perhaps confl ating the two descriptions, for Appian did indeed describe the physical layout of the city (App. Pun. 96), although without recourse to metaphor. Nevertheless the analogies of Braudel and the Picards, while topographically evocative, also reveal their fundamental conception of Carthage as a maritime state. Th e 'city as ship' is a motif with a long pedigree: it goes back to Alcaeus, and, in a 2 Alc. frg. 6, 208a; note also Pl. Resp. 488a-e; Leg. 758a, 945c. Ezekiel 27 (on Tyre). 3 Th is speech is, perhaps, the cause of Braudel's slip. 4 Censorinus was not the only Roman commander to be attributed such a view. Cicero makes Scipio Aemilianus, the eventual destroyer of Carthage, compare inland and coastal settlement, and argue that maritime cities put themselves at risk in several ways (Cic. Rep 2.4.7-8).
Enemies could arrive at any time from the sea, traditional customs are transformed by foreign ways and merchandise, traffi cking the sea and moving to other lands scatters the population, causing the people to forget how to farm and fi ght, while the infl ux of luxuries leads to moral degeneracy. In Scipio's view, contact with the sea brings military, but primarily commercial and cultural dangers, and he cites Carthage as a specifi c example. He sees only one advantage: a man can get anything from overseas and can export his own produce (2.4.9)-a commerce that, given the thrust of his argument, is made to seem morally problematic. Censorinus also compared naval aff airs with merchants' gains: both had the potential for increases, but they could also bring crowds of losses (App. Pun. 87). By implication, the power of Carthage was like a commercial risk. 4 Our understanding of Punic thalassocracy has been driven by such conceptualisations. Th e notion that Carthaginian naval power was a commercial thalassocracy was most immoderately put by Arnold Toynbee.
5 He characterised the Carthaginians as parasites drawing a middleman's profi t from trade in the Western Mediterranean. Th e navy furthered this parasitic existence by supervising a monopolisation of trade through a "wooden wall. "
6 He saw evidence for this in the
